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Abstract
Objective: To audit the recently established Critical Incident Reporting System in the Department of 
Anaesthesia and Critical Care Medicine, University of Zimbabwe Medical School. The system was set up with1 
the purpose of improving the quality of care delivered by the department.
Design: Cross sectional study. A  critical incident was defined as ‘any adverse and reversible event in theatre, 
during or immediately after surgery that if it persisted without correction would cause harm to the patient’. 
The anaesthetic or recovery room staff filled a critical incident form anonymously. Data was collected from 
critical incident reporting forms for analysis.
Setting: The anaesthetic service in the two teaching hospitals of Harare Central and Parirenyatwa General 
Hospitals.
Subjects: Between May and October 2000, 62 completed critical incident forms were collected.
Main Outcome Measures: The nature of the incident and the monitoring used were recorded, the cause was 
classified as human, equipment or monitoring failure and the outcome for each patient reported. There was 
no formal system for reminding staff to fill in their critical incident forms.
Results: Atotal of 14165 operations were performed over the reporting period: 62 critical incident forms were 
collected, reporting 130 incidents, giving a rate of 0.92% (130/14165). Of these, 42 patients were emergencies 
and 20 elective. The incidents were hypotension, hypoxia, bradycardia, ECG changes, aspiration, laryngospasm, 
high spinal, and cardiac arrest. Monitoring present on patients who had critical incidents was: capnography 
57 %, oxymetry 90 % and ECG 100 %. Other monitors are not reported. Human error contributed in 32/62. 
of patients and equipment failure in 31/62 of patients. Patient outcome showed 15 % died, 23 % were 
unplanned admissions to HDU while 62 % were discharged to the ward with little or no adverse outcome. 
Conclusion: Despite some under reporting, the critical incident rate was within the range reported in the 
literature. Supervision of juniors is not adequate, especially on call. The stress under which everyone has to 
work includes poor morale, drug shortages, poor equipment and power cuts with no backup generator. Despite 
this, the challenge for senior personnel is to improve quality of care. In other countries similar audits have led 
to change of practice and improvement in the safety features of the service provided by the hospital and staff.
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The critical incident system is now well established as a 
concept and activity of a quality programme in anaesthesia. 
Most publications are from well resourced countries with 
little contribution from developing countries. When 
something goes wrong in the anaesthetic management of a 
patient, that event is the final outcome of a process that 
began some time before. The event may or may not be the 
‘fault’ of the anaesthetist, but that the system (environment) 
in which he/she works, allows certain errors to occur 
without correction. Eventually, the cumulative or co­
incident effect of several such errors leads to the “something 
going wrong”. A critical incident system identifies such 
errors, alerts participants to the types of errors in the 
system, enabling corrective measures to be put in to place, 
rendering the environment safer.
The Department of Anaesthetics and Critical Care 
Medicine, University of Zimbabwe Medical School has 
introduced a Critical Incident Reporting System as part of 
their quality programme. The audit presented here is a 
review of that process.
Materials and Methods
Setting.
The anaesthetic environment covers 19 theatres in two 
teaching hospitals of about 1000 beds each (Harare Central 
Hospital and Parirenyatwa Hospital). These two hospitals 
share specialist referral responsibility for the whole country 
with two others 350km away in Bulawayo. Most specialities 
are represented with neurosurgery, cardio-thoracic surgery, 
head and neck and general surgery being the most complex. 
During the audit period the Anaesthetic Department 
consisted of 15 Consultants and 18 trainees on the specialist 
programmes of Diploma in Anaesthetics and Masters in 
Anaesthesia, 10 nurse anaesthetists and eight trainee nurse 
anaesthetists. A technical department separate from 
anaesthetics services the equipment. Availability of drugs 
and spare parts is a recurring problem. A consultant 
anaesthetist leads themajority of lists; others havephysician 
or nurse trainees supported by a consultant in a nearby 
theatre or by the on-call consultant. The same trainees 
cover the 24hour call service with a consultant available 
from home. The on-call consultant is the responsible 
person for all emergency cases. An anaesthetic registrar 
call system exists when staffing levels permit, but was not 
in place during the audit. Nurse anaesthetists are on-call for 
obstetrics only, although they may participate, as a team 
member or leader, in all elective lists. During this period all 
junior physician anaesthetists were trainees on the DA or 
MMed programme. There were no service staff. 
Methodology.
The process of critical incident monitoring commenced 
in May after several explanatory meetings within the
Introduction department. The anonymous nature of the reporting was 
emphasised. Copies of the forms were placed in all 
anaesthetic rooms and recovery areas in both hospitals in 
specially made pockets and posted in prominent places. 
Boxes for receiving completed forms were also placed in 
all theatre suites. Staff were reminded at all opportunities 
to fill in their forms, including at mortality and morbidity 
meetings and whenever an incident occurred. At the end of 
October all the forms submitted were reviewed and 
presented at a departmental meeting for discussion.
A critical incident was defined as: an event which led to 
harm, or could have led to harm, if  it had been allowed to 
progress. It should be preventable by change o f practice. 
(Royal College of Anaesthetists 1996).
The data form collected information about the grade(s) 
of anaesthetist present, whether elective or emergency, a 
pre-operative assessment, monitoring equipment used, 
nature of the incident, comments on the cause (whether 
human, equipment or monitoring) and the immediate and 
eventual hospital outcome of the patient. There was space 
for further comment from the anaesthetic team about the 
event. No information was collected about the time of day 
the event took place and the ASA grading (American 
Society of Anaesthesiologist Grading of pre-operative 
health status) had been omitted from the original form. No 
data on age, sex or grading of the severity of the incident 
or of the injury was collected.
Results
A total of 130 incidents were reported in 62 forms. Twenty 
of the forms reported elective cases and 42 forms were on 
emergency cases.
Table I: Breakdown o f 130 critical incidents reported May 
to October 2000.
Nature of Incident Frequency (%)
C a r d ia c  A r r e s t 9 (6.9)
L a ry n g o s p a s m 8 (6.2)
B ra d y c a r d ia 14(10.8)
A s p ira t io n 3 (2.3)
A b n o r m a l E C G 18(13.8)
H ig h  S p in a l 2(1.5)
H y p o te n s io n 44 (33.8)
S w a b  in  p a t ie n t 1 (0.7)
C a n c e l le d 12(9.2)
H y p o x ia 20 (15.4)
In the 62 reports a consultant anaesthetist was present for 
Meases (22.6 %), of which nine (64%) were emergencies.
Monitoring was reported for those incidents as reported 
on the forms (Table II).
The contributory factors cited were grouped into four 
classes: human error, equipment failure, failure of 
monitoring and other or unclassified.
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Table II: Monitoring conducted during critical incidents reported.
Monitoring 
Equipment Used
Frequency of use 
of equipment (%) Comments
Electrocardiogram 60 (97) Every theatre has an ECG machine but the electrodes and electrode jelly are not always available. Often 
the leads are connected directly to the patient with KY jelly or similar preparation. No comment was 
made on why the two cases did not have this done.
Pulse Oxymetry 54 (87) Absent in 8 cases.
Power failure affected 7 cases.
Malfunctioned in 3 cases in which it was used.
Blood Pressure Measurement 60 (97) All lists have access to automatic blood pressure machines of different makes. No comment was made 
why the two cases did not have this done.
Capnography 34 (55)
Beside the assumed continuous presence of the anaesthetist, no other monitors were reported, such as central venous monitoring.
Table III: Contributory factors cited for the incidents.
Human error: 32 of 62 reports
1. Inadequate assistance quoted in 8/62 cases. There are no trained anaesthetic assistants. Any available nurse may be assigned the role. There is'no intermediate 
cadre between junior on-call staff and consultant during the on-call service. Unavailability of consultant was cited in 4/8 times. Personal mobile phones are the main 
method of contact between staff since the bleep system has collapsed completely..
2. Use of the wrong drug was mentioned in 3/32 cases.
3. Failure to intubate occurred in 4 /32 Cases. Two of these were obstetric patients and all four were emergencies. None were identified as potentially difficult in 
advance.
4. Fatigue and undue haste accounted for 6/32 cases. Mostly this led to early extubation with attendant iaryngospasm, hypoxia, re-intubation or vomiting and 
aspirating.
5. Other factors reported as human error were inadequate preparation leading to commencement of the case before blood, or laboratory results were available or 
resuscitation was adequate.
Equipment failure: 31 of 62
1. A major failure was caused by a power cut for Parirenyatwa Hospital. The emergency generator failed to provide back up because it had also broken down. Four 
patients were affected by this incident including a child for closure of patent ductus arteriosus. All patients were manually ventilated till awake and extubated and 
discharged to the ward. In the recovery room the oxymeter and blood pressure machines failed. Battery supported lighting was present and manual blood pressure 
monitoring and a stethoscope was used. No adverse effect on the patients was reported.
2. During one anaesthetic for an emergency case the anaesthetic machine switched itself off three times. The cause of this incident could not be identified during the 
operation. Follow up later still could not establish the cause.
3. The oxygen sensors on all the machines were not working during this audit period. Most of the reservoir bags and breathing tubing had leaks and showed previous 
attempts to plug these.
4. Capnography was present for 34 cases but were not calibrated to give a numerical reading, because the calibration gas was not available.
Failure of monitoring: 3 of 62
1. A critically ill patient, post bronchoscopy, had undetected pneumothorax in recovery till patient collapsed. ICU was full. Managed in recovery.
2. An obstetric patient who had total spinal could only be monitored using NIBP.
3. A critically ill obstetric patient could only be monitored with NIBP and ECG. The oxygen gauge on the anaesthetic machine was not working. 
Other: 2 of 62
1. Suction machine failed to function in a vomiting/aspiration patient.
2. Operating table could not be tilted head-down in a vomiting patient in one case.
There were 23% unplanned admissions to the high dependency unit (HDU) and ICU, and nine deaths out of the 62 cases 
(15%).
Table IV: Cause of deaths recorded during the audit period.
1. Failed intubation in a difficult-to-intubate patient, led to emergency tracheostomy. Patient died two weeks later due to a blocked tracheostomy tube.
2. Two obstetric haemorrhage patients post Caesarean section. Blood not available in time.
3. Ruptured aortic aneurysm: unsuccessful resuscitation.
4. Very ill paediatric patient monitored with ECG and pulse oxymeter. At end of operation developed bradycardia and asystole.
5. Very ill patient post bronchoscopy, pneumothorax, hypoxia and hypotension.
6. Two multiple injury patients. Blood not available in time.
7. Severe sepsis: died in ICU.
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For a Critical Incident Reporting System to improve an 
anaesthetic service, we require the participation of the 
whole department to first report any incidents and then to 
change the working environment. The purpose of this audit 
was to review performance of the reporting system and to 
identify areas of improvement in the data collection. Regular 
feedback keeps everyone involved and allows ownership 
of the improvement process.
The critical incident rate of 0.92 % (130 /14  165) found 
in this study is within the range reported in the literature 
from well-resourced countries (range 0.28 to 2.8%).3'5 
What people may report as a critical incident may vary 
depending on the expectation both patient and staff may 
have of the anaesthetic episode. Nausea or post operative 
pain in recovery may be reported as a critical incident 
because it is preventable, may lead to further undesirable 
and harmful effects and can be adequately monitored. In 
other settings they may not be reported unless vomiting or 
injury occur.
The compliance for reporting in this report was not 
estimated but in the literature, is reported to vary from 18% 
to 74%.5 Active methods of reminding colleagues such as 
prominent notices, regular reminders, designation as a 
duty for registrars to remind and collect the forms, have 
been reported as successful in improving compliance. As 
a result of this exercise, the data collection form has been 
redesigned. The reporting system is becoming established 
in the two hospitals. It is hoped that the Critical Incident 
Reporting System will be used in other institutions both in 
the private and public sector.
Aconsultant was present in only 22% of cases while 68% 
of critical incidents occurred on emergency lists. The 
Confidential Enquiry in Peri-operative Deaths (CEPOD) 
made similar observations when auditing the factors related 
to perioperative mortality in hospitals; poor supervision of 
juniors; emergency cases being done late at night when 
staff are tired; inappropriate decisions being taken by 
juniors. Closer supervision of trainees is difficult when 
consultant numbers are small and workloads heavy. 
Nevertheless, a daytime consultant-led emergency list has 
been advocated as a solution.
Themortality of 15 % needs explaining. The unavailability 
of blood at the right time was responsible for four deaths. 
In the past the hospital blood bank made blood available 
within a short period of requesting it. During the study 
period there were several factors cited for blood not being 
given, despite requesting it on time, and delaying surgery. 
Currently, blood samples are sent to the Blood Transfusion 
Service outside the hospital for typing and cross-matching. 
Delays are often caused by administrative factors, including 
unavailability of transport for delivery and collection. 
Junior surgeons are reluctant to call for assistance early 
enough to avert disaster. Surgical intervention is often late 
due to extended ward treatment beyond the beneficial, and 
late patient presentation to hospital. .
Discussion Unplanned admissions to the HDU are a recognised 
indicator of a critical incident, implying that an adverse 
event occurred that led to a change in post operative 
management for the patient. These admissions would be 
associated with higher m orbidity, more invasive 
interventions, increased hospital costs, longer hospital 
stay, and prolonged recovery. Identifying the process that 
led to such unplanned admissions would have significant 
cost effects.
The Zimbabwe Anaesthetic Association, as well as 
anaesthetic opinion worldwide, has advocated for and laid 
down minimum standards of monitoring for different 
institutions and procedures. For a teaching and referral 
hospital, the minimum standards ought to be met in order 
to teach and achieve good standards of practice. The 
multiplicity of equipment models makes it difficult to 
maintain a minimum set of working devices, or bulk buy 
for the institution. For example, at present the many 
different models of non-invasive blood pressure monitors 
in our theatres have mutually incompatible blood pressure 
cuffs. In the future open platform devices may allow us to 
keep our present procurement practices while maintaining 
a mixed stable of equipment.
The Critical Incident Reporting System is being 
introduced as part of a quality programme of the Division 
of Anaesthesia in two of Zimbabwe’s major referral 
hospitals. The health allocation in the national budget has 
declined from US $ 23per capita in 1985 to the current less 
than US $ 12per capita. The value of a quality programme 
under such severe resource restriction is not always apparent 
since making the required changes may not be seen to be 
feasible. Health professionals in rich countries build in 
quality programmes , to ensure that the environment for 
patients and staff is safe and protected, even when 
departments have to contain costs because of escalating 
patient need and demand. In resource-poor conditions, 
striving for quality still has to drive the search for how to 
improve services and patient care to preserve a culture of 
achieving standards in good medical practice. Often the 
resources needed to accomplish these standards are more 
to do with training and attitude than actual high expenditure.
Conclusion
In conclusion, a Critical Incident Reporting System is an 
essential part of sustaining quality assurance in anaesthetic 
practice. This audit has highlighted some of the difficulties 
in the reporting of the Critical Incident Reporting System 
established by the Department of Anaesthetics. A greater 
effort will be made to address this by increasing methods 
of reminding staff members. The audit has also highlighted 
and quantified the lack of senior support to the trainees 
especially in emergencies. The system of cover has 
improved with the introduction of registrar supervision of 
junior staff and methods of increased consultant cover are 
being explored. The risk of morbidity and mortality that, 
patients are exposed to through poor equipment and general 
working environment needs further attention.
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